The ceasefire is a done deal. Although it is not peace, it is nonetheless a very important achievement, especially in light of the series of unsuccessful talks in Doha and Cairo since the tragic and controversial 7 October 2023, with tens of thousands of casualties. On each occasion they were undermined by high-profile attacks (the Lebanese walkie-talkies), the bombing of diplomatic missions and the assassination of prominent figures (Nasrallah, the historic leader of Hezbollah, Aniyeh and his successor Sinwar in the leadership of Hamas). Not to mention the risks of a regional flare-up, with the exchange of missiles between Israel and Iran, the involvement of Lebanon with air strikes and the attempted ground invasion, and the spillover into Syria.
The ceasefire agreement, brokered by Qatar, Egypt and the US, will take effect on 19 January and last for 42 days, spread over three phases. Phase one will see the first exchange of Israeli hostages for Palestinian prisoners, the entry of humanitarian aid and the withdrawal of IDF forces to buffer zones. The second phase will mark the completion of the first, and the final phase will involve planning for reconstruction and the establishment of a new administration in the Strip.
Trump announced the news in advance on his social platform, ‘Truth’. He claimed credit for the deal, which speaks volumes.
While Biden claims credit for the effectiveness of the roadmap he outlined last May, the message from his successor in the White House points to a decisive factor: the ceasefire will be the springboard for reviving the Abrahamic Accords brokered by his administration.
Hamas is hailing the fruits of steadfast Palestinian resistance to Israel’s destructive violence, while the government in Tel Aviv is less triumphalist, claiming victory for having punished the enemy and bringing the hostages home at last.
Hamas has been weighed down by developments in Syria, where the fall of Assad has severed the Iran-Hezbollah coordination that Palestinian guerrilla warfare had hitherto relied on, alongside Trump’s pressure and the threat of brining further hell on Gaza – if even possible.
Israel was faced with multiple variables. The ambivalent, unknown trajectory of Turkey-backed Syria could have played a role, indicating an eventual tendency to compete with Tehran for the role of prime NATO member – with enhanced denominational consistency, since Turks and Arabs have the same Sunni affiliation. Moreover, having lost the support of Damascus and fearing Trump’s grip, Tehran could build up its nuclear arsenal, having already entered into a global strategic partnership with Russia, which could complement its defence capabilities with a deterrent function.
Likud’s close ties with the US Republican Party, reinforced by Netanyahu’s close ties with Trump, make the former sympathetic to the tycoon’s intention to normalise the Middle East, not least by integrating Saudi Arabia into the Abrahamic Accords: Not only to entrust the Israeli-Saudi partnership with the management of the Middle East, but also to remove Riyadh from the sphere of influence of the BRICS countries and to counteract the de-dollarisation of the market, which is being fuelled by the diversification of the currency of payment for Arab crude oil exports (including the Chinese yuan currency). In return, the Saudis could be offered the reconstruction of Gaza, thereby enabling them to expand their interests into the Mediterranean, also pursued in Lebanon.
As it turns out, most roads lead to Washington, in anticipation of Trump’s inauguration. At this stage, Hamas and Israel will have started to reflect on the objectives they could pursue in the dead-alley they entered in the last 15 months, far beyond the horizon of the massacre, which is claiming victims even amongst the conventions of the supposed global order on which it is based. For the people of Gaza, this massacre means decimation, while for Tel Aviv it also means international discredit, internal protests mobilised by the families of the hostages, job insecurity due to conscription, traumatic stress among IDF troops and a blockade of Red Sea trade inflicted by the Houthis.
In fact, the ceasefire agreement is fraught with a number of unknowns. Any violation, however episodic, could trigger a flare-up. Moreover, will Hamas accept the unscripted part of the agreement, i.e. its own evacuation from the Strip, with the ANP taking over the administration of Gaza? Will Netanyahu’s cabinet refrain from using the buffer zones (which ones?) assigned to the IDF as outposts for settlers in the northern part of the Strip, as the right-wing extremists and religious Zionists in the cabinet want, or will the ceasefire in Gaza lead to an attempt to gain the upper hand in the West Bank for more illegal settlements? In the long term, the consequences of desperation and hatred are looming in the background, soaked in bloodshed, incubators of revenge.
These are factors that need to be considered, but they should not hamper the courage to build peace, to navigate through uncertainties and to start again after failures – there is always a starting point. This ceasefire is that point.
